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MANDATORY ARREST AND NO-DROP 
POLICIES: VICTIM EMPOWERMENT IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
ERIN L. HAN* 
Abstract: In recent decades, arrest and prosecution have been applied 
to perpetrators of domestic violence with increasing severity, repre-
senting an important step in recognizing domestic violence as a crime. 
Some jurisdictions have taken the war against domestic violence a step 
further, by employing aggressive "mandatory arrest" and "no-drop 
prosecution" policies. These policies have been met with mixed 
reactions from advocates of battered women and law enforcement 
agencies, who debate the effectiveness of the policies, both in curbing 
crime and in treating the needs of victims. This Note analyzes whether 
and to what extent specific aggressive arrest and prosecution policies 
are compatible with a victim-centered empowerment approach to 
domestic violence advocacy. It concludes by recommending various 
compromise approaches, which treat domestic violence as the crime 
that it is while at the same time empowering victims to become 
survivors. 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern campaign against domestic violence as we know it 
has been waged since 1962.l The year is 2002 and the statistics are still 
appalling. An estimated two million American women2 are vic-
* Editor in Chief, BOSWN COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2002-2003). 
1 Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence 
from Colonial Times to the Present. reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN AND '!HE LAW 10 (Clare 
Dalton & Elizabeth M. Schneider eds., 2001). 
2 The author recognizes both the tragedy of domestic violence as a very real problem 
in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender relationships, and the fact that victims are not 
always women and that perpetrators of domestic assault are not always men. See Amy Adg-
ington, Anyone But Me, reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN AND '!HE LAw, supra note 1, at 134; 
DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT '!HE MEN WHO LOVE. THEM (1991), 
reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN AND '!HE LAW, supra note 1, at 148, 149; About the Newsletter, 
NETWORK NEWS, Fall/Winter 2001, at 2. Nonetheless, because 85% percent of domestic 
violence victims are, in fact, women, with 95% of the perpetrators men, this Note will pri-
marily use language that reflects these statistics. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in 
Battered Mothers. 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1224, nA (2001). The intention is not to ignore 
or silence those who do not match with traditional depictions of victims and perpetrators. 
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tims/ survivors3 of domestic violence at the hands of their male part-
ners.4 More women seek medical attention for harm suffered at the 
hands of an intimate partner than for injuries caused by auto acci-
dents, rapes, and muggings combined.5 Women are more likely to be 
beaten, raped, or killed by a current or former male partner than by 
anyone else.6 Between 22 and 35% of female emergency room pa-
tients are there because of injuries inflicted on them by their part-
ners.7 One out of four pregnant women has a history of being 
abused.s One-third to one-half of female homicide victims were mur-
dered by a male partner.9 
Clearly, domestic violence is a deeply entrenched problem in 
American society.to As activists step up the campaign for reform on all 
fronts, it has become accepted within the feminist community that 
partnership with state law enforcement agencies is an essential com-
ponent of efforts to eradicate domestic violence. ll Traditionally, acts 
of violence in the home were largely ignored by law enforcement, 
who viewed domestic violence as a "private" matter, inappropriate for 
Rather, this language is used out of respect for the large number of women who have suf-
fered at the hands of men over the course of history, whose voices were silenced by gender 
discrimination. See Pleck, supra note 1, at 14. Furthermore, the author recognizes that the 
dynamics of battering in same-sex relationships, while in many ways similar to battering in 
heterosexual relationships, do have certain nuances that could simply not be done justice 
as a side note in this Note. See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED 
WOMEN AND THE LAW 133 (2001). Rather, the role of law enforcement in gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transsexual relationships would warrant separate discussion in a future Note 
devoted specifically to this subject. See id. 
3 The terms "victim" and "survivor" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note 
to recognize both the pain inflicted within the domestic setting by intimate partners as 
well as the resilience that these "victims" show in surviving their abuse. See DALTON & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 3; Edward Gondolf & Ellen Fisher, Battered Women as Survivors: 
An Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness, reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, 
supra note 1, at 107,108. 
4 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2. at 5. These statistics were compiled by the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and refer to the number of women who have been 
the victims of "severe assault" by their partners. Id. According to the AMA, the actual inci-
dence is probably double that found through research, making the number of victims a 
probable four million women in the United States alone. Id. 
5 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
ProsecutoTs, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 8 (1999); Thomas L. 
Kirsch II, PTOblems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution 
oftheiT Abusersr, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 385-86 (2001). 
6 Epstein, supra note 5, at 8. 
7 Id. at 7-8; Kirsch, supra note 5, at 385-86. 
8 Kirsch, supra note 5, at 385. 
9 Id. at 386. 
10 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 5. 
11 Pleck, supra note 1, at 11, 16. 
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state intervention.12 If domestic violence is to be eradicated, then it 
must be taken as seriously as other criminal offenses by law enforce-
ment agencies, which must commit to ending this practice and bring-
ing perpetrators to justice.13 Without the cooperation and activism of 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges, the state sends a message to 
would-be perpetrators and victims that battering is condoned by the 
state and that it will be permitted without repercussion.14 
That there should be some level of partnership between domestic 
violence activists and law enforcement is as far as the concensus goes, 
however.15 In recent years, a heated debate has ensued within both 
the feminist and law enforcement communities as to the most appro-
priate way for law enforcement to assist in the struggle to end domes-
tic violence,16 To the frustration of police officers and state prosecu-
tors, domestic violence victims are often "uncooperative" in the state's 
efforts to prosecute and convict their batterers,17 Many states have re-
sponded to both the traditional failure of law enforcement to react to 
violence in the home and the frequent lack of cooperation by victims 
by adopting "mandatory arrest" and/or "no-drop prosecution" poli-
cies. ls Mandatory arrest policies completely remove police discretion 
and require arrest in all cases where officers have probable cause to 
believe that an act of domestic violence has occurred.19 No-drop poli-
cies require prosecution of a domestic violence perpetrator, regardless 
of the victim's wishes, and often force the victim to participate in the 
12 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 6 (2d ed. 1996). 
13 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 44 (2000). 
14 See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A 
Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 801, 850-51 (2001); James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter 
Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 155 (Kersti \110 & Michelle 
Bograd eds., 1990). 
15 Compare Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Arrest is No Panacea, reprinted in BATTERED 
WOMEN AND THE LAW supra note 1, at 603, 604, with Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: 
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Pmsecutions, reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN 
AND THE LAW supra note 1, at 623, 623. 
16Id. 
17 See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, PTOsecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BATTER-
ING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 100 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Casey G. Gwinn & Sgt. 
Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and Prosecutor, reprinted in BAT-
TERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 628, 628. There are numerous reasons why a 
battered woman might decide not to participate in the prosecution of her batterer or even 
demand his arrest. See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
18 See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999). 
19 Vito Nicholas Ciraco, Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory Arrest, Arc We Win-
ning?: An Analysis in NewJerscy, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 169, 170 (2001). 
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prosecutorial process.20 While too little state intervention can be ex-
tremely detrimental to the safety of victims, too much intervention in 
the form of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution may intrude 
upon the autonomy of victims in a way that calls the appropriateness 
of these policies in to question.21 
This Note analyzes whether mandatory arrest and no-drop poli-
cies are compatible with the best interests of domestic violence vic-
timS.22 Part I explains the empowerment model of advocacy and its 
importance to feminists in the movement to end domestic violence.23 
The remainder of the Note operates under the assumption that the 
empowerment model is the best way to serve most victims of domestic 
violence.24 Part II examines the public roles and duties of police 
officers and prosecutors to determine whether and to what extent a 
concern for the best interests of victims should factor into those roles. 
After clarifYing the role of empower men t in the missions of law en-
forcement agencies and actors, Part III analyzes the compatibility of 
both mandatory arrest and no-drop policies to a victim-empowerment 
approach to domestic violence.25 Part IV then suggests alternatives to 
both policies that will better balance criminal accountability and vic-
tims' interests. 
Most academic scholarship has considered mandatory arrest and 
no-drop policies together as either jointly empowering or disempow-
ering of domestic violence victims. While the two policies are com-
plementary to one another and operate as two stages in the same pro-
cess, it does not follow that one cannot exist without the other.26 This 
20 Chiu, supra note 2, at 1231. 
21 Mills, supra note 18, at 611-12. 
22 See Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the Con-
trol of the Abuser, 88 CEO. LJ. 605, 621-22 (2000). 
2S See 1 Lois H. Kanter & V. Pualani Enos, Domestic Violence Manual, 149 (2001) (un-
published manuscript, on file at the Domestic Violence Institute at Northeastern Univer-
sity School of Law, in the law school's clinical offices in Boston, Massachusetts.) The man-
ual is distributed to law student and professional advocates who serve domestic violence 
victims through one of the Institute's many clinical programs. 
24 See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, M.D., 'I'RAUMA AND RECOVERY 133 (1997);Jones, supra 
note 22, at 621; Mills, supra note 18, at 604; Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REv. 33, 62 (2000); Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 
149. 
25 This Note does not address the "effectiveness· of mandatory policies in ending do-
mestic violence, but only the compatibility of the empowerment model with prosecution 
strategies. 
26 See Cahn & Lerman, supra note 17, at 96. (In arguing that arrest and prosecution 
should work together to be effective, the authors point out cases where this does not hap-
pen, demonstrating that the two can exist independently of one another.) 
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leaves open the possibility that one policy is compatible with victim 
empowerment, while the other is not. This Note addresses mandatory 
arrest and no-drop prosecution policies individually, analyzing each 
on its own terms, while remaining mindful of their intersections 
throughout. 
I. THE VICTIM-EMPOWERMENT MODEL OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE ADVOCACY 
Approaches to victims of domestic violence can generally be di-
vided into two categories: directive and empowering.27 The directive 
model is most closely aligned with the traditional approach to lawyer-
ing employed by most attorneys.28 Under that model, the advocate 
tells her client what she ought to do given the lawyer's assessment of 
the client's situation.29 The empowerment model is quite contrary to 
the traditional style of lawyering employed by the directive model.3° 
Under the empowerment model, the client is the decision-maker.31 
The advocate simply provides information in a setting that is safe and 
conducive for contemplation, and ultimately allows the client to de-
cide what to do with her situation.32 
The empowerment model, while perhaps not appropriate for all 
forms of lawyering, is particularly well suited to working with victims 
of domestic violence.33 This is best understood by looking at the dy-
27 See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 133. 
28 DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH 
17-18 (1991). 
29Id. 
3DId. at 17 (using a "client-centered" model to refer to the same concept as the 
"empowerment model" discussed here); Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at iv. (including 
Binder's "client-centered" model in a broad section on the "empowerment model"). 
31 Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 151. 
32Id. 
33 See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 133. Herman's critical book Trauma and Recovery, 
while written from the therapy perspective, has been widely adopted by domestic violence 
legal advocates to explain and justify the empower men t model. See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 2, at 1071; Jones, supra note 22, at 621. The following passage provides a sum-
mary of Herman's approach: 
The first principle of recovery is the empowerment of the survivor. She must 
be the author and arbiter of her own recovery. Others may offer advice, sup-
port, assistance, affection and care, but not cure. Many benevolent and well-
intentioned attempts to assist the survivor founder because this fundamental 
principle of empowerment is not observed. No intervention that takes power 
away from the survivor can possibly foster her recovery, no matter how much 
it appears to be in her immediate best interest. 
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namic of abuse present in a battering relationship.34 Domestic vio-
lence is not simply about men hitting women and injuring them 
physically.35 A batterer is generally not trying to hurt the woman he 
batters only to cause injury,36 but to dominate her so as to gain power 
and control over every facet of her life.37 The violence is used by a 
batterer as a tool to instill fear in his victim.38 This fear, kept fresh by 
renewed incidents of violence, is what allows a batterer to exercise 
power and control over his victim, often over a long period of time.39 
Women and men stay in abusive relationships for a myriad of 
complex and often logical reasons,40 including, but not limited to, the 
following: the financial dependency of the victim on her batterer;41 
fear (often based on threats) that the batterer will get custody of the 
children if she tries to leave him;42 fear that he will have her deported 
if she is an undocumented immigrant;43 cultural or religious mores 
HERMAN, supra note 24, at 133. 
34See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 136. 
35 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 57; David Adams, M.Ed., Identifying the Assaul-
tive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, BOSTON BAR J. 23, 24 (July/August 1989). 
36 See NEIL S. JACOBSON, PH.D. & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, PH.D., WHEN MEN BAlTER 
WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 67 (1998). 
37 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 57. 
38Id. at 56. 
39Id. 
40 See Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 122. 
41 SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 43. As part of his effort to control his victim, a batterer 
will often make sure that he takes care of all financial arrangements in the household. 
Karla Fisher et at. The Culture of Battering and the lWle of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 
46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2121 (1993); see LINDA G. MILLS, THE HEART OF INTIMATE ABUSE 23 
(1998). 
42 SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 43; Adams, supra note 35, at 23. Massachusetts has 
taken the step of making domestic violence a reI evan t factor in custody dispu tes, requiring 
written findings of fact where custody is assigned to an abusive parent, whether or not the 
violence was targeted towards the children. See The Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 
440 (Mass. 1996). However, not all states have taken this step, and in those jurisdictions, 
courts continue to argue that domestic violence committed by one parent against the 
other is irrelevant to the determination of custody. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 
366. Some courts even go so far as to criminally prosecute battered women who "fail to 
protect" their children from violence perpetrated by the children's father. See Michelle 
Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Lia/Jility for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Stat-
utes, reprinted in BAlTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 306. Women have been 
found culpable for their children's abuse even when the perceived "failure to act" was 
posited on threats by the batterer that action by the mother would result in additional or 
more grievous harm to the children. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State 
Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, reprinted in BAlTERED WOMEN 
AND THE LAW supra note 1, at 320. 
43 Since 1994, there are now legislative provisions that allow a battered immigrant 
woman who is married to her batterer to file for permanent resident status on her own. 
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that would condemn her for leaving the relationship;44 fear that leav-
ing would heighten her physical danger;45 fear for the welfare of fam-
ily members;46 lack of networks, friends, or other sources of emotional 
support;47 a belief that she is incompetent and needs her batterer to 
survive in the world;48 the belief that she "deserves" to be abused be-
cause of her own imperfections or behavior;49 and finally, love for her 
abuser.5o 
Protections for Battered Immigrant Women and Children, Pub. L. No. 103-322(G), 108 
Stat. 1953. 
44 NICKY ALI JACKSON & GISELE CASANOVA OATES, VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATION-
SHIPS: EXAMINING SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 233-34 (1998). 
45 Adams, supra note 35, at 23. This has proven to be a very well-founded fear. Jd. Stud-
ies show that a battered woman is often in the most danger from her batterer when she 
tries to leave. Jd. This is because leaving is a sign to the batterer that his control over her 
has been threatened, and he might be inclined to lash out at her with an even greater 
show of force than before to regain that control or to retaliate against her. See Donna K. 
Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & 
WOMEN'S STlJD. 71, 129 (1992). 
46 See Fisher et aI., supra note 41, at 2117, 2122. A batterer might increase his control 
by threatening not only his victim but also those close to her. Jd. This is a powerful control-
ling tool because a woman might endure a great deal more battering than she otherwise 
would if she feels that she would put her loved ones in danger by leaving. See id. 
47 Adams, supra note 35, at 24. By isolating his partner from her friends, family, and 
other support networks, an abuser increases his victim's emotional dependency on him, 
thereby shutting out voices of encouragement and reason that might come from people 
who care. Jd.; see also Fisher et aI., supra note 41, at 2132. 
48See Roddy Doyle, The Woman Who Walked Jnto Doors, reprinted in BATrERED WOMEN 
AND TIlE LAw supra note I, at 69. Some batterers go so far as to play mind games with their 
victims to try to convince them that they are "crazy" and are unable to survive without the 
abuser. See JACOBSON & GOTlMAN, supra note 36, at 79. These tactics often incorporate a 
denial of past abuse. Jd. at 78. 
49 Adams, supra note 35, at 24. Intimate abuse very frequently includes verbal and 
emotional abuse, where the batterer attacks the self-esteem of his victim with insults, name 
calling, and profanity. Jd. Mter a period of time, this barrage wears away at a battered 
woman's sense of self worth. Jd. Particularly if her contact with other, more positive, voices 
is limited she begins to believe what her partner says about her. Jd. She might even come 
to believe that she brings the abuse upon herself by not behaving appropriately or by not 
being "good enough." See Doyle, supra note 48, at 69; see also Fisher et aI., supra note 41, at 
2132. 
50 See Fisher et aI., supra note 41, at 2140. In order to understand this final reason that 
a woman will stay with her abuser, it is important to understand that domestic violence 
often happens in a cyclical pattern. See Lenore Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women 
Kill and How Society Responds, reprinted in BATrERED WOMEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note I, at 
65. That is, batterers generaily are not always violent. See id. Certainly in the beginning of 
the relationship, many victims report that the man who later became an abuser was often 
the most "romantic and attentive lover" that she had ever dated. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN 
BATrERED WOMEN KILL 40 (1988). By the time the violence begins (often after marriage, 
pregnancy, or some other sign of commitment), the woman is in love with her batterer. Jd. 
at 42. This love, in and of itself, goes a long way toward explaining why a battered woman 
will try to explain away her abuser's behavior and why she may be quick to offer him a 
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Given the complexity of the reasons why a battered woman might 
stay with her abuser, disentangling a victim from her situation is not as 
simple as picking her up and carrying her to safety.51 Even the most 
dedicated advocate is limited in the amount of time and energy that 
can be devoted to each battered women seeking assistance.52 Nor can 
absolute safety be guaranteed by state protective mechanisms,53 given 
that incarceration for crimes of domestic violence tends to be for a 
relatively short period of time. 54 
Not only are state solutions limited, but these solutions might 
actually do damage to the recovery of a battered woman by replicat-
ing the control wielded by the abuser.55 When a state or advocate 
forces a woman to leave or to take other action, rather than empower-
ing her to make these decisions on her own, the state has simply suc-
ceeded in transferring power from one controlling entity to another.56 
This directly undermines the victim's efforts to regain control over 
her own life by communicating to her that the batterer was right all 
along-that she is incompetent and incapable of surviving on her 
own.57 
Alternately, when control is held by a survivor, she begins to real-
ize that she is competent, that she is not crazy, and that she has 
worth.58 A battered woman does not regain her autonomy by having 
others continue to make decisions for her; she regains her autonomy 
by making decisions for herself. 59 Thus, those persons and agencies 
seeking to help a victim of domestic violence can best meet her needs 
"second chance." Id. at 50. Even after the first incident of violence, future incidents often 
happen in a cyclical nature, referred to as the "cycle of violence." Walker, supra, at 65. Un-
der this model, violence is followed by a period of calm, often called the "honeymoon 
phase," during which time the batterer will lavish gifts on his partner and make intense 
promises never to harm her again. Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 91. 
5t MILLS, supra note 41, at 213. 
52 HERMAN, supra note 24, at 149. 
53 MILLS, supra note 41, at 213. 
54 See 2 Lois H. Kanter & V. Pualani Enos, Domestic Violence Manual, 215 app.2 
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the Domestic Violence Institute at Northeast-
ern University School of Law, in the law school's clinical offices in Boston, Massachusetts). 
In Massachusetts, maximum commitment to the house of corrections or to jail is two and a 
half years for assault or assault and battery. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13 (A) (2000). 
55 See Mills, supra note 18, at 554. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 589. 
58 Id. at 605; Winick, supra note 24, at 64. 
59 See Mills, supra note 18, at 605; Winick, supra note 24, at 63-64. 
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by empowering her to make these decisions, rather than by dictating 
solutions.60 
New life decisions may not come quickly. Afterall, "[a] woman 
experiencing what may [be] her lowest and most vulnerable time 
must face tasks daunting to a person in ideal conditions. "61 The survi-
vor must, therefore, be permitted to work towards her freedom at a 
pace that is acceptable to her and that increases her sense of auton-
omy with each step she takes.62 
Critics of the empowerment model question the ability of a bat-
tered woman to make her own decisions because she is being "coer-
cively controlled" in the relationship and is hence viewed as incapable 
of assessing her own needs.63 While this may apply to some battered 
women, evidence instead shows a great deal of rational behavior 
among victims of domestic violence.64 The rationality of this behavior 
has a tendency to be overlooked, however, by persons who are unfa-
miliar with the long list of reasons why a woman might stay in an abu-
sive relationship.65 
In many situations, a decision to stay is not a result of "helpless-
ness"66 so much as a conscious choice that the risks of leaving out-
60 See Mills, supra note 18, at 605; Winick, supra note 24, at 62, 63-64. 
61 Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 121. 
62 See id. at 166. 
63 See Jones, supra note 22, at 612,631 (illustrating how far a directive model might be 
taken, by suggesting that guardianship is the best way to handle some domestic violence 
victims). jones's approach represents the antithesis of the empowerment approach, in 
which a judge would be encouraged to declare an adult battered woman incompetent to 
make life choices for herself, and could then appoint a family member or friend as her 
guardian, essentially stripping the victim of all legal autonomy until such a time as her 
choices fall more closely in line with what the court wants for her. Compare id. at 642, with 
Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 151.Jones even discusses a court decision, In Re Conserva-
torship of Barbara J Frarck, in which a woman's guardianship was awarded to someone else, 
largely based on her decision to remain with her batterer. 1993 WL 139537; Jones, supra 
note 22, at 641-42. The judge in this case ignored the very rational reasons why this 
woman might have chosen to live with her boyfriend, and instead declared her choice to 
be evidence of her irrationality. Jones, supra note 22, at 641-42; see discussion supra notes 
41-50 and accompanying text. This outrageous solution to domestic violence would fea-
ture friends and family members, rather than the state, as replicators of an abuser's control 
over a battered woman, thus further reinforcing the batterer's message that she is incom-
petent and incapable of making choices for herself. SeeJones, supra note 22, at 644-45. 
64 See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1259-60. 
65 See id.; supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
66 LENORE E. WALKER, The Psychological Theory of Learned Helplessness, in THE BATrERED 
WOMAN 73 (1979). In this controversial and widely repudiated book, Walker based her 
assessment of battered women as "passive" and "submissive" and "helpless" on studies of 
dogs given electrical shocks in cages who, after a time, did not leave their cages to escape, 
even when the doors were eventually opened. Id. at 73-74. Walker responded to critics in 
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weigh the benefits.67 A 1992 study found that of the 31 help-seeking 
strategies described to battered women in the study, the women had 
tried an average of 13 of these strategies.68 This study challenges char-
acterizations of domestic violence victims as passive and incapable of 
self-help by showing that battered women continue over time to seek 
help, even though doing so often results in increased violence.69 
Proponents of the directive model focus ostensibly on the safety 
of the victim, with the presumption that "leaving" is the safest thing a 
woman can do. 70 The fatal flaw in this analysis, however, is that these 
directive model theorists neglect the overwhelming evidence that a 
battered woman is often in the greatest amount of danger when she 
attempts to leave the abusive relationship.71 While no one can predict 
with 100% accuracy when a batterer may turn lethal, the person best 
equipped to make this determination is probably not a prosecutor or 
a divorce attorney, but the victim herself.72 Because a survivor of do-
mestic violence knows her batterer best, she is best able to gauge 
when his words, expressions, and tone of voice indicate that she is in 
danger. 73 And ultimately, she will bear the consequences of underes-
timating him.74 
The empowerment model recognizes that some of the choices 
presented in domestic violence cases are simply too important and 
1993 by reframing her "learned helplessness" theory in a discussion of battered women's 
syndrome (BWS), as a subcategory of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). DALTON & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 117, n.1. BWS has been used as a defense for women who 
killed their batterers and as an explanation offered by expert testimony in trial as to why a 
battered woman might recant her original testimony and side with her batterer. People v. 
Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1097 (Cal. 1996); Connecticut v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1114 
(Conn. 1993). BWS has, on the one hand, been useful to give scientific credence to do-
mestic violence theories. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 211. On the other hand, 
the use of BWS is now seen by many domestic violence advocates and scholars as unfortu-
nate in that it has the tendency to explain what could very well have been a rational re-
sponse by a battered woman in "terms that imply abnormality and illness." Id. 
67 See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1259-60; Jill Davies, Batferer Generated Risks, reprinted in Kan-
ter & Enos, supra note 23, at 203-05. 
68 Fisher et aI., supra note 41, at 2135-36. The help-seeking strategies inquired about 
in this study included: "talking to the abuser about the abuse, consulting family and 
friends, calling the police," leaving the abuser, seeking counseling, and seeking legal ad-
vice. Id. at 2136. 
69 Id. 
70 See Jones, supra note 22, at 617. 
71 See Adams, supra note 35, at 23. 
72 See Kan ter & Enos, supra note 23. at 195. 
73 See id;JACOBSON & GOTIMAN, supra note 36, at 72-73. 
74 Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 151. 
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too difficult to be made by an advocate with little personally at stake.75 
When legal options cannot guarantee, and may even jeopardize safety, 
the victim must be informatively and supportively empowered to 
make the tough calls for herself. 76 
Reliance on the battered woman to assess her own safety does not 
mean that activists and state actors have no role in this process.77 
Within the empowerment model there is a very important role for 
these actors to present a battered woman with options and scenarios 
that she may not have considered on her own.78 An advocate might 
even challenge a woman's assessment of her situation and still be op-
erating within the empowerment model approach, so long as the final 
decision is left to the survivor. 79 
Finally, it should be noted that in very limited situations, more 
state intervention might be warranted.80 This kind of intervention 
would be appropriate, for example, in cases where a victim of domes-
tic violence suffers from an identifiable mental illness, as diagnosed by 
a trained clinician,81 that truly prevents her from making decisions on 
her own behalf.82 It would not apply to cases where a victim simply 
makes decisions that others would consider "not in her best inter-
est. "83 
The victim-empowermen t model is widely held by domestic vio-
lence experts to be the approach that best addresses the needs of bat-
tered women and men.84 Given that empowerment is the preferred 
approach for dealing with victims, the next question is whether and to 
what extent the best interests of victims, defined generally here as 
their need to be empowered, should factor in as a concern of police 
officers and prosecutors in the state system. 
75 Sec id. at 195. 
76 Sec MILLS, supra note 41, at 213-14. 
77 See Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 195. 
78 See id. 
79 Sec id. 
80 Sec Mills, supra note 18, at 607-08. 
81 See id. at 608. 
82 See id. at 607-08. 
83 Sec id. 
84 See HERMAN. supra note 24, at 133; Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 151. In their 
manual, which is distributed to law student advocates working with Northeastern Univer-
sity School of Law's Domestic Violence Institute Clinics, professors Lois Kanter and 
Pualani Enos state that "[t]he most lasting, effective advocacy for battered women is based 
on the empowerment model," and "' [cllient empowerment' '" remains an important 
principle which advocates must understand and adopt." Kanter & Enos, supra note 23, at 
149,151. 
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II. THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE AND 
PROSECUTORS: How Do VICTIMS FACTOR IN? 
A. The Police 
The oath taken by a police officer is one taken "to the public. "85 
Until recent years, police officers generally did not treat domestic vio-
lence victims as part of the "public" that they were sworn to protect.86 
Historically, the state classified domestic violence as a "private" issue 
that was inappropriate for intervention by law enforcement agen-
cies.87 
Feminists have been successful in demonstrating the discrimina-
tory way in which such a public/private divide allows men to abuse 
women and children in their homes without fear of sanction.88 As a 
result, the notion of domestic violence as a "private" issue has been 
largely discredited.89 Thus, the responsibility of police officers to the 
public has been expanded to include a responsibility to protect pri-
vate citizens, which includes victims of domestic violence.9o 
More specifically, since 1977 nearly all states have codified a 
greater concern for domestic violence victims within specific domestic 
violence statutes that affect the roles of police officers.91 These stat-
86 See Jennifer Hagan, Note, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War7: The Fight 
Against Domestic Violence After the Death of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 50 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 919, 973 (2001). 
86See id. at 974-75. 
87 See Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 158 (1824). According to the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi at the time of this case, 
Family broils and dissentions cannot be investigated before the tribunals of 
the country, without casting a shade over the character of those who are un-
fortunately engaged in the controversy. To screen from public reproach those 
who may be thus unhappily situated, let the husband be permitted to exercise 
the right of moderate chastisement, ... and use salutary restraints in every 
case of misbehaviour, without being subjected to vexatious prosecutions, re-
sulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned. 
Id. Although Bradley was overruled by Harris v. State in 1894, husbands in many states have 
enjoyed immunity from civil suits by their wives until only recent years. Harris v. State, 71 
Miss. (1 Walker) 462,464 (1893). For example, Missouri did not explicitly abolish the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity until 1986, and the doctrine continues to endure in Geor-
gia and Louisiana. Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Clare Dalton, 
Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts, and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 
319,324 (1997). 
88 SeePleck, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
89 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 974-75. 
90 See id. at 973, 975. 
91 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 121. 
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utes vary from state to state, but many incorporate the needs of vic-
tims into law enforcement functions by re-articulating the elements of 
domestic violence crimes,92 allowing warrantless arrest in cases of sus-
pected domestic violence,93 and requiring that police officers take 
affirmative measures to educate victims about their legal rights.94 
Through statutory enactment, attention to the interests of domestic 
violence victims has become deeply entrenched in the official man-
date of police forces around the country.95 
B. P1'OSecutoTS 
The prosecutor plays many roles in the American criminal justice 
system.96 According to ABA Standards 3-1.2(b), the prosecutor is si-
multaneously an "administrator of justice, and an advocate, and an 
officer of the court .... " In balancing these many roles, there is a 
general consensus that the prosecutor is primarily responsible in the 
execution of her duties to the interests of society as a whole.97 The 
National Prosecution Standards clearly articulate the primacy of the 
public over the individual interest: 
The prosecutor should at all times be zealous in the need to 
protect the rights of individuals, but must place the rights of 
society in a paramount position in exercising prosecutorial 
discretion in individual cases and in the approach to the 
92 [d. at 124. Generally, domestic violence crimes could be charged as assault and bat-
tery under previously existing laws. [d. However, other common elements of abusive rela-
tionships such as harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or threats are not 
easily prosecuted when responding police officers classify the case as a case of assault and 
battery. [d. Combining the elements of these above crimes into one domestic violence 
statute enhances the police response to domestic violence by honing law enforcement 
officers' understanding of domestic violence. [d. Furthermore, by collapsing the elements 
of domestic violence crimes into one statute, police departments have a tendency to re-
spond affirmatively, with the recognition that they face an increased possibility of civil li-
ability for failure to enforce the statue. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 124. 
93 [d. at 123. 
94 [d. at 126. Some such statues require police officers to give victims written informa-
tion regarding protective options under the laws of the state. See id. 
95 See id. at 121. 
96 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (b) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
97 Attorney Gen. v. Nathan Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 489 (1921); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS, RULES & 
STATUTES (john S. Dzienkowski ed., 2000) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; NAT. PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS 1.3 (Nat'l Dist. Attorney's Ass 'n, 2nd 1991). 
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larger issues of improving the law and making the law con-
form to the needs of society.98 
Nonetheless, even though a victim is not the prosecutor's "client" 
in the sense that her interests do not dictate a prosecutor's decisions, 
protecting the interests of victims remains an important part of the 
prosecutor's job description.99 That respect for victim interests consti-
tutes a valid component of a prosecutor's constituency is reflected in 
the ABA guidelines of professional conduct, the fact that the victim is 
a particularly vulnerable member of society, and the corresponding 
realization that many of the victim's interests correlate directly with 
the in terests of society as a whole. lOo 
ABA Standard 3-3.2(h) states that, "Where practical, the prosecu-
tor should seek to insure that victims of serious crimes or their repre-
sentatives are given an opportunity to consult with and to provide in-
formation to the prosecution prior to the decision whether or not to 
prosecute .... " While the victim's opinion does not direct the deci-
sion to prosecute, this standard assumes that her wishes and views will 
be considered by a prosecutor. 101 Standard 3-3.9 (b) (v) makes this 
point more explicitly by listing the "reluctance of a victim to testify" as 
a valid reason for a prosecutor to exercise her discretion not to prose-
cute a particular case.102 
In addition, prosecutors must consider victim interests in the 
course of protecting the interests of society because domestic violence 
victims are among the members of society in the greatest need of pro-
tection. 103 This is true because victims of domestic violence are gener-
ally at a greater risk for future abuse than are other crime victims due 
to the intimate nature of the relationship between victim and 
abuser.I04 Thus, prosecutors have a heightened responsibility in do-
mestic violence cases to consider the safety interests of the victims in 
the course of carrying out their societal responsibilities. Io5 
There are also pragmatic reasons for prosecutors to consider the 
wishes and opinions of domestic violence victims when prosecuting 
98 NAT. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 97, at 1.3. 
99 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 96, at 3-3.2 (h). 
100 See discussion infra Part Ill.A.3. 
101 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 96. at 3-3.2(h). 
102 See id. at 3-3.9(b) (v). 
103 See Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of Do-
mestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB.LJ. 953, 960-61 (2000). 
104 !d. at 961. 
105 See id. at 960-61. 
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their cases. A victim's interests are often compatible with society's 
overall interest in preserving scarce judicial resources and in encour-
aging victims to come forward to ask for state assistance in the first 
place.106 If victims are generally known to be coerced into participat-
ing in the prosecution of their batterers, many victims may decide not 
to report intimate abuse to the authorities. Reluctance to report vio-
lent crime demonstrates a serious loss of public faith in the justice sys-
tem,I07 an outcome that is against the interests of society as a whole. 
Another practical way in which victim interests affect society is in 
the distribution of scarce judicial resources. lOS Preservation of judicial 
resources to support the maximum public good is a reality that prose-
cutors must weigh when considering which cases to prosecute. I09 In a 
case based solely on victim testimony, it is important for prosecutors 
to consider the willingness of victims to participate in prosecution.110 
This is because state resources might be wasted if the prosecution per-
sists and loses a case where the only witness is unwilling or reluctan t to 
testify.11l 
In conclusion, a prosecutor's primary responsibility is to the pub-
lic at large. ll2 However, in representing the interests of society, prose-
cutors have a duty to consider the interests of victims as a part of that 
society, and particularly as the part of society most at risk for future 
victimization. ll3 To the extent that prosecutors must show at least 
some consideration for the best interests of victims, these state actors 
should incorporate an empowerment model of advocacy into their 
public roles.1l4 
III. THE COMPATIBILITY OF MANDATORY POLICIES WITH VICTIM 
EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES 
In concluding that victim empowerment must factor at least par-
tially into the professional responsibilities and goals of law enforce-
ment officers and prosecutors, it is appropriate to examine whether 
106 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 178-79. 
107 See id. at 179. 
108 See id. at 178-79; Kirsch, supra note 5, at 417-18. 
109 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 178-79; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 96, at 
3-3.9. 
110 See Kirsch, supra note 5, at 417-18. 
111 See id. at 417-18. 
112 Tufts, 239 Mass. at 489; MODEL CODE, supra note 97, at EC 7-13; NAT. PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 97, at 1.3. 
m Vilhauer, supra note 103, at 960-61. 
114 See id. 
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and to what extent mandatory arrest and no-drop policies empower 
victims of domestic violence. 
A. Mandatmy Arrest Policies 
Mandatory arrest policies require police officers to arrest a sus-
pect whenever the officer has probable cause to believe that an assault 
or battery has taken place, whether or not the officer has a warrant or 
has even witnessed any violence.1l5 Prior to enacting mandatory arrest 
laws, most state laws already permitted a police officer to make a war-
rantless arrest in cases where there was probable cause of domestic 
violence.1l6 The novelty of the mandatory arrest laws, therefore, is 
that they remove discretion on the part of police officers who might 
be otherwise reluctant to arrest suspects in domestic cases.1 17 
A national growth in mandatory arrest policies followed a widely-
circulated and controversial 1984 study that linked an increase in ar-
rests in domestic violence cases to decreased recidivism in batterers.1l8 
While mandatory arrest policies have helped to subject domestic vio-
lence crimes to greater public scrutiny, these policies were adopted 
largely out of concern for law enforcement, through decreasing re-
cidivism in batterers, and less out of a concern for victim 
empowerment.119 
Since their inception, mandatory arrest policies have generated 
enormous controversy among legal analysts and battered women's 
advocates.120 This controversy does not· merely center around the 
empowerment model versus directive model debate. 121 Even within 
the empowerment camp itself, there is extensive debate as to whether 
mandatory arrest policies actually empower or disempower battered 
115 Ciraco, supra note 19, at 170; Mills, supra note 18, at 558. 
116 Mills, supra note 18, at 558. 
117 See id. 
liB See id. The study is "controversial," because its validity has been called into question 
by subsequent efforts to replicate its outcome. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 117. 
"Replication studies" failed to corroborate this 1984 "Minneapolis Domestic Violence Ex-
periment" (MDVE). Id. The MDVE reported a decrease in violence when measured six 
months after arrest; however, when replication studies measured violence 11 months after 
arrest, there was no significant difference in recidivism between the arrest and non-
arrested group. Id. at 113. Some of these "replication studies" further concluded that ar-
rest actually correlated with an increased level of recidivism among batterers who were 
unemployed and/or Mrican American. Id. at 113, 114. 
119 See DAL IDN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 595-96. 
120 See id. at 596. 
121 See Winick, supra note 24, at 79. 
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women.122 Within this controversy, mandatory arrest policies have 
been characterized in four ways: 1) that they are disempowering be-
cause they take away control from victims of domestic violence;123 2) 
that they empower victims by showing that the state will support their 
efforts to leave their batterers;124 3) that mandatory arrest policies do 
take control away from victims, but that this usurpation of control is 
warranted while the victim is incapacitated by trauma;125 and 4) that 
this stage in law enforcemen t is neither empowering nor disempower-
ing because it need not involve the victim at all, but is a matter be-
tween the defendant and the state.126 
1. Mandatory Arrest as Disempowering of Victims 
Critics of mandatory arrest argue that the policy disempowers 
victims of domestic violence by taking away choice from the victim 
and instituting a penalty on her batterer that she may not desire to 
impose.127 By removing choice from the victim, critics argue that the 
state replicates the control wielded by the batterer.128 This threatens 
to perpetuate the disempowerment of the victim by sending a mes-
sage that she is too helpless to survive without the controlling direc-
tion of a stronger person.129 
In addition to this more abstract form of disempowermen t, there 
are specific ways in which mandatory arrest policies can further en-
trench a victim's vulnerability in the abusive relationship.130 For ex-
ample, when police officers respond to a domestic violence call, it is 
sometimes difficult to identify the primary aggressor, particularly 
where both parties allege violence and where both parties exhibit in-
juries. l3l Many victims of battering relationships fight back in self-
defense during at least some incidents of abuse.132 Thus, it is not un-
common for a primary aggressor to be physically injured when police 
122 See id. 
12! Id. at 72-73; see Chiu, supra note 2, at 1229; see also infra Part III.A.1. 
124 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 12, at 143; see also infra Part m.A.2. 
125 See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1261; Hagan, supra note 85, at 975-76; see also infra Part 
m.A.3. 
126 See Coker, supra note 14, at 850-51; see also infra Part III.A.4. 
127 Winick, supra note 24, at 72-73; see Chiu, supra note 2, at 1229. 
128 Winick, supra note 24, at 72-73. 
129 See id. at 72. 
1!!O See Coker, supra note 14, at 831-39; Mills, supra note 18, at 588-89. 
m See Mills, supra note 18, at 588. 
1!2 Id.; Coker, supra note 14, at 831. 
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arrive on the scene.133 Under these circumstances, police officers in a 
mandatory arrest jurisdiction often arrest both parties rather than 
determine who was the primary aggressor.134 Such arrests can be ex-
tremely detrimental to victims of domestic violence because they hold 
the victim responsible for her abusive relationship.135 Furthermore, if 
her conduct cannot be successfully characterized as self-defense, she 
might face severe consequences, regardless of the overall reality of the 
relationship.136 
Arrest can also have many negative effects on a battered woman 
with regard to her children.137 Even if an arrested victim is eventually 
released without being charged, arrest can prevent her from gaining 
presumptive custody in some states if she later seeks to leave the abu-
sive relationship.138 In addition, mandatory arrest policies can expose 
a family to intervention by the Department of Social Services 
(DSS),139 despite the injurious effect such intervention might have on 
the battered mother.140 DSS frequently forces victims of domestic vio-
lence to choose between staying with the batterer and keeping their 
children.l41 While this policy might be warranted in certain cases, it 
often has the effect of second guessing the survivor's best judgment 
about the safest solution for herself and her children. It also ignores 
the reality that leaving can place a domestic violence victim and her 
133 See Mills, supra note 18, at 588. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
135 See Coker, supra note 14, at 831-32. For immigrant women, conviction for domestic 
violence can result in deportation. [d. at 831. Recent immigration law has gone part way in 
recognizing and responding to this problem. [d. Current legislation allows the Attorney 
General to waive deportation in the case of a battered woman who can prove that she is 
not the primary perpetrator of violence in her relationship and that she was "acting in self-
defense." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(7)(A)(i) (I) (2002). However, a victim may have difficulty 
meeting this standard if, in the case of ongoing violence, she does not meet the "self-
defense" standard in a particular incident. Coker, supra note 14, at 831-32. 
137 See Coker, supra note 14, at 832, 835-36. 
138 See id. at 832. 
139 DSS is likely to get involved in these cases, where, as in Massachusetts, police 
officers are mandatory reporters. Assault or assault and battery; punishment, MASS. GEN. 
LAws ch. 119, § 51A (1999). As a mandatory reporter, police officers are required by law to 
report to DSS any child that he/she has reasonable cause to believe "is suffering physical 
or emotional injury resulting from abuse inflicted upon him which harm or causes sub-
stantial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare including sexual abuse, or from ne-
glect .... " [d. Furthermore, some states have interpreted neglect broadly, to include cases 
where a child has witnessed, but not been the direct target of abuse. See DALTON & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 292-93. 
140 See Coker, supra note 14, at 835-37. 
141 [d. at 835-36. 
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children in far greater danger than temporarily staying.142 Critics of 
mandatory arrest argue that forcing such a choice too early can 
gravely disempower women by blaming and placing the responsibility 
for change on the victims rather than on the perpetrators.143 
2. Mandatory Arrest as Empowering to Victims 
In contrast, there is an alternate view of mandatory arrest policies 
that regards these policies as empowering of domestic violence vic-
tims.144 According to one analyst, "[t]he most common complaint of 
battered women regarding response is that the police do not do 
enough .... In fact, the strongest negative ratings of victim satisfac-
tion with police response often come from those women who desired 
a harsher response. "145 This argument focuses on the notion that, his-
torically, police officers have tended not to arrest batterers, even when 
victims wan t arrests to occur.146 There is no question that failure of 
police officers to arrest under these circumstances trivializes the grav-
ity of victims' concerns, places the victim in greater danger, and dis-
courages her from calling the police in the future. 147 
The cases most at issue in the mandatory policy debate, however, 
generally surround those women who urge against arrest.148 Those 
who view mandatory arrest as empowering in these instances focus on 
the safety reasons that the woman might have for vocalizing a request 
not to arrest. 149 These theorists look beyond a woman's urging against 
arrest to the meaning behind her 911 call as the best indicator of her 
true wishes.150 They argue that arrest in these cases best empowers a 
woman who has taken the step of calling the police to know that such 
a step will be taken seriously by law enforcement, even if she feels too 
threatened to directly ask for the arrest of her batterer.151 
142 Id. at 835. 
143 See id. 
144 Winick, supra note 24, at 71. 
145 Coker, supra note 14, at 842-43. 
146 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 935-36. 
147 See id. at 937. 
148 See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 15, at 604. 
149 See Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest oj Batterers, A Reply to Its Critics. in Do ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 143 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Ha-
gan, supra note 85, at 937. 
150 See Stark, supra note 149, at 143; Hagan, supra note 85, at 937. 
151 See id. The problem with this theory is that there are many reasons that a battered 
woman may call the police besides seeking to have her batterer arrested. See Chiu, supra 
note 2, at 1230. She may only want physical or medical assistance or to have the police 
escort her abuser out of the residence. Id. Finally, this theory fails to address those cases in 
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3. Mandatory Arrest as a Warranted Usurpation of Control During 
Immediate Trauma 
An alternate characterization of mandatory arrest policies ac-
knowledges that these policies do take away a certain amount of con-
trol from the victim.152 Under this theory, however, the usurpation of 
control is warranted in certain instances under the empowerment 
model because of the immediacy of the threat and the victim's state of 
shock.153 When the police respond to an inciden t of domestic vio-
lence in progress, their decision regarding arrest will necessarily be 
made at the scene and in close proximity to when the abuse took 
place. A victim at the scene of the crime is likely injured or trauma-
tized from the recent violence. Under these circumstances, she may 
very well be incapable of determining whether she wants her batterer 
arrested at that time.1M According to one author: 
Safety and stabilization are critical at the beginning; other-
wise, the battered woman will only be capable of acting as an 
agent within the limiting and debilitating confines of her vic-
timization. Her efforts at moving towards desirable outcomes 
will only be frustrated by the uncontrollable behavior of her 
abuser. Once a battered woman and her children have been 
provided a safe and separate environment, her agency is en-
hanced and her victimization is reduced.155 
This characterization of mandatory arrest policies differentiates 
the circumstances in which such arrests are generally made from 
other stages in the law enforcement process.156 At this stage, the vic-
tim is so close in time to the act of violence that, even under the 
empowerment model, it would probably not be appropriate to cede to 
her wishes at that time. 157 Instead, a mandatory arrest policy is appro-
priate because it requires responding officers to arrest the perpetrator 
in order to create a safe environment for the victim to recover physi-
cally and emotionally and to plan her next steps.l58 
which the woman never called the police, but where the call was placed by a neighbor, 
child, or other family member. Id. 
152 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 975. 
153 See id. at 975-76; Chill, supra note 2, at 1261. 
154 See Chill, supra note 2, at 1261. 
155 Id. 
156 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 975-76. 
157 See id. 
158 Id.; see Winick, supra note 24, at 71-72. 
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4. Mandatory Arrest as Neither Empowering Nor Disempowering 
A final theory characterizes arrest as a stage in the criminal sys-
tem solely between the perpetrator and the state, with no victim in-
volvement. Unlike the prior theories, this theory rejects the notion 
that mandatory arrest policies remove choice and autonomy from the 
victim by claiming that this choice never belonged to the victim in the 
first place.l59 This theory directly criticizes the tendency of law en-
forcement to address only public wrongs while ignoring crimes com-
mitted in the private sphere and failing to acknowledge that "private" 
crimes are still crimes against the state.160 Once the police have found 
probable cause from evidence of injury, the state of the home, or 
neighbor testimony, the police then have a public safety obligation to 
arrest the abuser, just as they would in the case of a public crime.161 
Furthermore, the victim need not even make a statement, be-
cause probable cause can be found on the basis of other evidence.162 
This arrest sends the message to the perpetrator that, regardless of 
what the victim herself might tolerate, domestic violence is wrong and 
will not be tolerated by the state.163 Because such an arrest would 
surely occur as a result of an act of violence occurring in public, man-
datory arrest ensures that the location of violence in the home can no 
longer serve as a buffer against accoun tability.164 
5. Analysis 
At first glance, mandatory arrest appears to be a disempowering 
policy in that arrest is required regardless of victim preferences.l65 A 
closer analysis, however, reveals two reasons why mandatory arrest 
policies are not necessarily disempowering to victims after all. l66 First, 
159 See Coker, supra note 14, at 850-51. 
160 See id. at 850-51; Ciraco, supra note 19, at 176. A study published in 1996 demon-
strates the disparate treatment by the police of "public" and "domestic" crimes. See Eve 
Buzawa, et aI., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Vt1rsus Stranger Assault: Is There a Difference,!; Do 
Arrests and Restraining Orders Work', in BATrERED WOMEN AND TIlE LAW, supra note 1, at 
591-92. When several variables were held constant, including the presence of a weapon, 
the presence of the perpetrator at the scene, and the seriousness of the victim's injuries, 
this study found that arrest was twice as likely in stranger assault as in domestic assault. Id. 
161 Ciraco, supra note 19, at 176. 
162 See Chiu, supra note 2, at 1230. 
165 See Coker, supra note 14, at 850-51. 
164 See id. 
165 Winick, supra note 24, at 72-73; see Chiu, supra note 2, at 1229. 
166 See infra Parts m.A.3, m.A.4. 
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a victim is likely to be in shock when the decision to arrest is made}67 
During, and only during, the specific, limited time that the victim is in 
pain and in the presence of her batterer in their home following the 
violent incident, it cannot be assumed that she is capable of making a 
rational decision concerning her relationship with her batterer.168 Ar-
rest does not necessarily mean that prosecution will occur. Even with-
out prosecution, arrest provides a victim with time and temporary 
safety to recover from the abuse and to think through her situation 
outside of the threatening presence of her batterer,169 In this short 
period of reprieve, the police can connect the victim with an advocate 
and with resources, so that she can make future choices based on an 
educated understanding of her options.170 
Another reason why mandatory arrest does not necessarily dis-
empower is that it does not necessarily involve the victim.l7l While the 
victim may have phoned the police and may choose to make a state-
ment against her abuser, mandatory arrest policies do not require 
that she do so.172 Rather, a lawful arrest is based on the observations 
of the police upon their arrival at the scene of the alleged crime.17:! It 
is vital that the police act on these observations in homes with the 
same seriousness that they act on observations of crimes occurring 
outside the homes, independent of victim testimony or coopera-
tion.174 
In conclusion, while not always empowering, mandatory arrest 
policies are not necessarily disempowering, because they respond only 
to an immediate threat of violence, where probable cause is observed 
first hand by the police.175 Furthermore, mandatory arrest policies 
increase the likelihood that survivors will be able to make informed 
decisions later on, once they have had a chance to recover from the 
immediate instance ofviolence.176 
After arrest, prosecution is the next stage in the criminal process. 
Here the challenge for prosecutors shifts from determining whether 
there is probable cause that domestic violence occurred to proving 
167 See Gondolf & Fisher, supra note 3, at 115; Winick, supra note 24, at 81. 
168 SeeChiu, supra note 2, at 1261. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 1230. 
172 See Mills, supra note 18, at 558. 
173 DAL'ION & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 594. 
174 See Coker, supra note 14, at 850-51. 
175 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 975-76. 
176 Seeid. 
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the victim of violence 
might be the only witness to the crime, her involvement becomes im-
portant to prosecutors as they seek convictions. 
B. No-drop Prosecution Policies 
In general, a no-drop prosecution policy is one in which the state 
prosecutor decides whether to prosecute a domestic violence perpe-
trator, regardless of the victim's wishesp7 These policies range from 
strict or "hard" no-drop policies to highly deferen tial policies.178 A 
"hard" no-drop policy is one in which the state will push forward a 
prosecution using all means availableP9 In addition to submitting 
into evidence the testimonies of police officers and neighbors and 
excited utterances made by the victim at the time of the alleged at-
tack, prosecutors in these jurisdictions might subpoena a victim to 
testifY against her wil1.lBO Prosecutors may go so far as to arrest or even 
imprison victims who fail to comply with their subpoenas.l81 On the 
other end of the spectrum, deferential drop jurisdictions defer com-
pletely to the wishes of the victims, routinely dropping charges ac-
cording to victim desires.182 
While "hard" no-drop prosecution is most notorious for coercing 
the participation of victims,l83 these policies also include efforts to 
prosecute that do not involve the victim, such as encouraging meticu-
lous fact finding by police officers and the submission of excited ut-
terances at the trial.l 84 For the purposes of analyzing the empowering 
or disempowering nature of "hard" no-drop prosecution, the policy 
will only be examined to the extent that victims are forced or coerced 
to cooperate in the prosecution of their batterers. These "victim-
coercive"l85 no-drop policies are justified by advocates on many 
grounds.l86 The following three justifications will be addressed below: 
177 See Mills, supra note 18, at 561. 
178 See Kirsch, supra note 5, at 386. 
179 Chiu, supra note 2, at 1231. 
180 See id. 
181Id. 
182 See Kirsch, supra note 5, at 386. 
HIll SeeChiu, supra note 2, at 1231. 
184 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 627; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 17, at 627. 
185 To avoid confusing the overall components of a "hard" no drop policy with the 
specific aspect of victim coercion that will be discussed here, this Note will refer to "victim-
coercive" no-drop policies in the subsequent discussion. 
186 See Kirsch, supra note 5, at 408; Jones, supra note 22, at 633-35; Kalyani Robbins, No-
Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate1, 52 STAN. L. 
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the "good of society," victim safety, and the emotional empowerment 
of victims. 
The first argument attempts to justify victim-coercive no-drop 
policies on the grounds that they serve the general state interest of 
ending abusive relationshipsl87 and because they encourage equality 
between men and women.ISS Thus, the sacrifice of indhidual victim 
interests are regarded by these proponents as necessary for overall 
societal change.189 
The validity of this society-based rationale is called into question, 
however, to the extent that victim coercion by the state mimics the 
same kind of terrorizing power and control used by the abuser.190 De-
spite the fact that victims often choose not to testify out of a genuine 
fear for their safety,191 extremely coercive policies actually permit 
prosecutors to throw an uncooperative victim in jail for failure to an-
swer a subpoena to testify.192 Here, the state uses the general notion of 
the "good of society" as justification to employ tactics of coercion like 
those used by the batterer to force compliance from an already victim-
ized citizen.193 Surely the "good of society" is itself damaged when so-
ciety's most vulnerable members come to regard the state with even 
more fear and mistrust than they regard their abusive partners.194 
Hence, victim-coercive no-drop policies cannot be justified solely by 
the argument that they protect the supposed best interests of society 
at large. 
A second argument in favor of victim -coercive policies focuses on 
the supposed safety needs of the victims.195 This theory recognizes the 
power and control dynamics intrinsic in an abusive relationship,196 but 
argues that domestic violence victims are incapable of making their 
REv. 205, 220 (1999); Vilhauer, supra note 103, at 961-62; Hagan, supra note 85, at 978; see 
also infra Part llI.B.1-3. 
187 Jones, supra note 22, at 633-34. 
188 See Robbins, supra note 186, at 207. Robbins refers to, "the larger social costs of 
domestic violence, which involve, inter alia, the societal subordination of women. Each 
time a man hits a woman and gets away with it, all women suffer, both from the risk of 
harm that has not been prevented, and from the retardation of the movement toward 
societal equality.· [d. (citation omitted). 
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own decisions because of the totality of the abuser's control,197 The 
state is thus justified in forcing prosecution because of the "saving" 
effect that prosecution is presumed to have.19B 
The problem with this argument is that it is based on a false as-
sumption that prosecution is necessarily the "best" or safest solution 
for the victim.l99 This overly optimistic view of prosecution ignores the 
continued access that the batterer often has to his victim during the 
pending trial, the reality that most offenders plead guilty to the 
charges to get probation, and the fact that jailed batterers usually re-
ceive relatively short sentences.200 Given the reality that even aggres-
sive prosecution will likely yield only a mild, if any, punishment, there 
are many reasons why a victim might be far safer by not aligning her-
self with the state.201 The following passage aptly describes the uncer-
tain reality of prosecution: 
Prosecution ... is no guarantee that the violence will stop. A 
woman who opposes prosecution is taking a calculated risk, 
as is the woman who actively pursues prosecution. Neither 
she, nor the judge or the prosecutor, can know with certainty 
which action will result in less violence. The problem is not 
that the batterer's coercion is not real, but rather that it is 
not always clear that the criminal justice system offers a bet-
ter alternative.202 
Recent studies further support this analysis of prosecution.203 
These studies have found that prosecution had no effect on the like-
lihood of re-arrest of the batterer within a six month period,204 
further calling into question the argument that state control benefits 
the vic tim. 205 
197 See Robbins. supra note 186. at 218-19. 
198 See id. at 219. 
199 Coker. supra note 14. at 826. 
200 MILLS, supra note 41. at 56. In one survey. only 1 % of domestic violence perpetra-
tors received jail time beyond time served at arrest. [d. 
201 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265. § 13(A) (2000). 
202 Coker, supra note 14. at 826. 
205 See Mills. supra note 18. at 567-68. 
204 [d. Another study found that a battered woman who chose to go forward with press-
ing charges in a jurisdiction where she was not compelled to do so was at a lower risk for 
subsequent abuse than a victim who was coerced or forced into cooperating with prosecu-
tion efforts through no-drop policies. [d. at 567. The researchers surmised that the preven-
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a measure of ·power" in the legal process. [d. 
205 See id. at 568. 
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A third argument in favor of victim-coercive no-drop policies 
contends that they actually empower the victim psychologically.206 
Proponents of this theory argue that a victim can be empowered 
through the process of prosecuting her batterer in a court of law.207 
Here, the ends (the supposed "empowerment" of a victim through 
the process of participating in the prosecution of her abuser) are used 
to justify the means (compelling or coercing victim participation).208 
This argument is also seriously flawed.209 First, the theory misuses 
the term "empowerment" as it is understood in domestic violence lit-
erature.210 This theory views the "empowerment" ofa victim as an end 
result that justifies a coercive process.211 Advocates of the 
empowerment model, however, never intended empowerment to be a 
result gained at all costs.212 Instead, empowerment is a process of en-
couraging and facilitating a victim's own decision-making, and it is 
through this process that the victim has the best chance to realize per-
sonal autonomy.213 
A second fatal flaw in this theory is that, even if the end result of 
"empowerment" is a worthy goal, there is no evidence that victims are 
actually "empowered" as a result of the policy.214 Instead, revictimiza-
tion is a widely documented result of forced victim participation.215 
Disempowermen t as a direct result of victim coercive policies can oc-
cur in a number ofways.216 In a worst case scenario, an uncooperative 
victim will change her original story when she testifies on the stand to 
protect her partner.217 The prosecutor will then impeach the victim's 
testimony through various efforts, such as submitting excited utter-
ances or prior inconsistent statements made by the victim or submit-
ting expert testimony as to why such inconsistency is common in do-
mestic violence victims.218 Hence the victim is disempowered on a 
206 See Robbins, supra note 186, at 218; Vilhauer, supra note 103, at 961. 
207 Robbins, supra note 186, at 218. 
208 See Vilhauer, supra note 103, at 961. 
209 See Kirsch, supra note 5, at 418. 
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number of levels.219 First she is disempowered by being forced to tes-
tify.220 Secondly, she is disempowered through the impeachment pro-
cess that brands her a liar or incompetent to speak in the public fo-
rum of a courtroom.221 Coerced participation perpetuates both the 
emotional trauma that the victim has suffered at the hands of her 
abuser222 and her already low self esteem by bolstering the notion that 
she is incompetent and without control.223 
From the perspective of victim empowerment, all three argu-
ments in favor of victim-coercive no-drop prosecution are critically 
flawed. 224 Efforts to force victim participation for physical safety or 
emotional empowerment simply do not hold up against the reality of 
victims' experiences.225 Furthermore, a policy with the potential to 
inflict serious damage on victims for the "good of society" should raise 
serious additional concerns. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO MANDATORY ARREST AND NO-DROP POLICIES 
THAT MAXIMIZE CRIME CONTROL AND VICTIM EMPOWERMENT 
Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies represent two 
extreme approaches currently taken by several states in an effort to 
"get tough" on domestic violence. These approaches focus more on 
punishing the perpetrator than on meeting the needs of victims in 
cases of domestic violence. It is therefore worth considering whether 
there are alternatives to these extreme policies that balance the goal 
of crime control with the need to empower victims of abuse. 
A. Presumptive Arrest 
Presumptive arrest is an alternative policy,226 regarded as an op-
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cases of domestic violence.227 Presumptive arrest resembles manda-
tory arrest in that police officers answering domestic violence calls are 
generally required to arrest the perpetrator, where there is probable 
cause.228 In a presumptive arrest jurisdiction, however, the police 
officer maintains a small degree of discretion not to arrest a perpetra-
tor when there are certain countervailing considerations urging 
against arrest.229 These countervailing considerations will most likely 
come from the expressed wishes of the victim and her analysis of what 
will keep her safe.230 
The strength of the presumptive arrest approach is in its bal-
ance. 231 The strong presumption that arrest is the appropriate re-
sponse to cases of domestic violence demonstrates that the state is as 
concerned with these crimes as it is with crimes that occur in the pub-
lic sphere.232 However, the discretion authorized by the policy recog-
nizes the unique difficulties presented in cases of intimate abuse.233 
The small window of discretion allows the police to tailor its response 
to the specific circumstances or wishes of each victim in each case.234 
Nonetheless, discretion is held by the police officer, who makes the 
final decision.235 This is appropriate at the scene of the crime, where 
danger may be so imminent that efforts to empower the victim to 
make her own decisions would be completely overshadowed by the 
disempowering presence of the batterer or the incident of violence 
itself. 236 
Critics of presumptive arrest policies argue that granting any dis-
cretion to police officers will result in that discretion being exercised 
too liberally, and that domestic violence will be taken less seriously by 
law enforcement in general.237 To respond to this concern, presump-
tive arrest jurisdictions should incorporate the following two sugges-
tions into their policies. First, in order for police to exercise their dis-
cretion in a way that is beneficial to domestic violence victims, these 
officers must receive comprehensive training regarding the dynamics 
227 See Winick, supra note 24, at 80. 
228 See id. at 83. 
229 [d. at 83; Hagan, sttpra note 85, at 976. 
230 Winick, supra note 24, at 83; Hagan, supra note 85, at 976. 
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of intimate partner abuse.238 Only when they truly understand these 
complex dynamics will police officers be equipped to exercise their 
discretion in a way that best meets the needs of victims and society.239 
Second, police discretion not to arrest should be further checked by 
requiring written findings when this discretion is exercised.240 These 
written findings should highlight the reasons why the officer decided 
not to arrest in the face of probable cause of domestic violence, focus-
ing on the impact that arrest would have on the vic tim. 241 This re-
quirement would permit supervisory review of how individual officers 
are exercising their discretion in the field. 242 Under these two condi-
tions, a presumptive arrest policy will best serve the interest of victims 
and society alike.243 
B. Non-Coercive No-drop Prosecution 
The preceeding discussion of victim-coercive no-drop policies 
clearly established that these policies are problematic from the per-
spective of victim empowerment.244 As with mandatory arrest policies, 
however, there is potential for a compromise that seeks to both em-
power victims and bring perpetrators to justice.245 There are many 
possible variations of this compromise solution, but essentially they all 
strive to diligently prosecute whenever this can be accomplished with-
out disempowering the victim.246 A good compromise no-drop policy 
must not force a victim to participate in the trial in any way against 
her will or better judgmen t. 247 These policies will be referred to as 
non-coercive no-drop policies. 
Non-coercive no-drop policies should be carefully distinguished 
from policies of complete deference.248 Deferential policies allow the 
woman, rather than the prosecutor, to make the ultimate decision as 
to whether the defendant will be prosecuted at al1.249 In contrast, in a 
non-coercive no-drop jurisdiction, a victim only has decision-making 
2118 See Hagan, supra note 85, at 977. 
259 See id. 
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authority over the extent of her own participation in the prosecu-
tion.250 The prosecutor still makes the final decision as to whether 
prosecution will proceed, with or without the vic tim. 251 
Non-coercive policies prosecute through the use of any and all 
evidence of abuse that exists, aside from the testimony of the vic tim. 252 
Testimony of police officers, family members, and neighbors as to the 
state of the defendant, victim, and the home; photographs of physical 
injuries and property damage; medical records; audio tapes of emer-
gency 911 calls; and excited utterances are all examples of evidence 
that might suffice to convict a particular defendant, even where the 
victim is unwilling to take the stand.253 
Where there is evidence of abuse, besides the testimony of an 
unwilling victim, that can be admitted in court, prosecutors should 
attempt to prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence based on that 
outside evidence.254 The police must be trained to investigate domes-
tic violence crimes with the same scrutiny that they employ in homi-
cide cases, where it is known from the outset that the victim will be 
unavailable to testifY.255 This approach to domestic violence cases will 
maximize the number of perpetrators who can be brought to justice 
without incurring the disempowering and revictimizing effects of a 
forced victim testimony.256 
Although external evidence is the cornerstone of non-coercive 
policies, there are numerous additional approaches that have been 
adopted by various jurisdictions.257 Some policies allow a victim to 
withdraw her cooperation only after she watches a video or talks with 
a victim witness advocate about the cycle of domestic violence258 and 
about resources available to her through the criminal justice system 
and the domestic violence victim-support community, so that her de-
250 See id. 
251 Chiu, supra note 2, at 1231. 
252 See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 17, at 628. 
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255 See Richard Devine, Targeting High Risk Domestic Violence Cases: The Cook County, Chi-
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cision to withdraw is an educated one.259 Interestingly enough, prose-
cutors and judges have noted that the time invested by the criminal 
justice community in counseling a victim and in really listening to and 
sympathizing with her needs and concerns often results in an in-
creased willingness of victims to voluntarily cooperate with the prose-
cution of her abuser.260 In this way, a policy that emphasizes victim 
empowerment might actually yield better victim cooperation for 
crime control agencies.261 
For all of the above reasons, prosecution offices around the 
country should continue to bolster non-coercive no-drop policies with 
creative approaches262 that balance crime control and victim interests. 
Prosecution of a batterer should be sought whenever possible, so long 
as the victim is permitted to determine her own level of participation 
in the process.263 
CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of crime con trol, mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution policies are accurately seen as complementary.264 
Police may feel less inclined to arrest where the arrest is not aug-
mented by forceful prosecution.265 In the same vein, pro-prosecution 
analysts view arrest that is not followed up by prosecution as in-
sufficient to deter future violence.266 This Note, however, aims to shift 
the focus from perpetrator to victim. From the perspective of the vic-
tim, it makes sense to consider mandatory arrest and no-drop policies 
separately because of the different purposes that each policy serves. 
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Mandatory arrest serves the immediate safety interests of the victim, 
at a minimum, providing a short period of separation and safety from 
the batterer so that the victim can evaluate her options.267 Prosecu-
tion, on the other hand, while it mayor may not enhance victim 
safety, aims primarily to hold perpetrators accountable for their 
criminal actions.268 It is important to recognize the distinct purposes 
of these two stages in the process so as to uphold the strengths in each 
policy while simultaneously attacking those elements that are prob-
lematic. An optimal policy arrangement need not choose between 
victim empowerment or crime control, but will combine components 
of each approach into arrest and prosecutorial policies that both em-
power victims and hold perpetrators accountable. 
The primary interests of police officers and prosecutors are 
couched, respectively, in terms of "public safety" and "the public in-
terest." However, both public actors must remember that domestic 
violence victims, unlike victims of many other crimes, are likely to be 
targeted for abuse again and again, often with increasing severity.269 
Greater abuse is often perpetuated by certain types of state interven-
tion. Hence, in the context of domestic violence, the victims are the 
members of the public most in need of police and prosecutorial re-
sponsiveness and sensitivity.270 A conscientious law enforcement 
officer must be able to gauge those individual circumstances under 
which arrest might place a victim in greater danger.271 Likewise, a con-
scientious prosecutor must appreciate that prosecution that forces 
victim cooperation might further endanger the victim, violating the 
responsibility that the prosecutor has to the public interest.272 
One important component of a victim-centered approach to jus-
tice is the recognition that mandatory policies are problematic in 
their lack of flexibility.273 Giving law enforcement the discretion to 
tailor responses to individual victim needs necessitates, however, that 
police and prosecutorial staff be well-trained and sensitive to the 
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unique issues surroundiug domestic violence.274 Absent this training, 
there is a real danger that too much discretion will be ceded to vic-
tims in cases where arrest and prosecution could proceed against a 
defendant without the victim's cooperation.275 
Along with enhanced trainiug on the dynamics of domestic vio-
lence, law enforcement personnel should also become increasingly 
knowledgeable about the array of community-based resources and 
services available to battered women and men.276 A "coordinated 
community response" can link the array of domestic violence serv-
ices,277 makiug them more easily accessible to victims. Such an ap-
proach recognizes that victims have needs that are not only legal but 
also medical, financial, educational, emotional, and socia1.278 By creat-
ing contacts with existing non-legal services, the criminal justice sys-
tem can contiuue to focus its resources on legal objectives. The non-
legal community is an important resource that can assist police and 
prosecutors in tailoring their own responses to the particular needs 
and situations of battered women. 
Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies demonstrate 
the progress that law enforcement has made iu recogniziug domestic 
violence as a crime that warrants societal outrage and batterer ac-
countability. The focus that each policy places on victim safety, al-
though naive to the greater danger that state intervention may create, 
is commendable at least iu iutent. If immediate safety or even saving 
lives are the only goals of the crimiual justice system, however, then 
these goals are far too limited. The goal of every advocate in the fight 
agaiust domestic violence must not end at the saving of a life, but 
must, more importantly, empower lives worth living.279 
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